The Ordinary Court of Bologna has recognized Italian citizenship by descent for US citizens in more than one case decided after the reform came into force, specifically through ruling no. 3335/2026 of April 17, 2026 (Judge Natascia Gardini) and ruling no. 4038/2026 of May 13, 2026. The cases were handled by the Milan-based law firm Aprigliano International Law Firm, one of Italy’s leading firms in Italian citizenship matters, specializing particularly in citizenship by descent through judicial appeals. These cases involve family lines beyond the second generation: individuals born abroad who request recognition as Italian citizens because they are descended from an Italian ancestor.
The significance lies in the dates. The appeals were filed after March 27, 2025, a date that has become a watershed moment for many citizenship lawsuits. On that day, Decree-Law 36/2025 came into force (subsequently converted into Law 74/2025), widely known as the Tajani Decree, which severely restricted access to Italian citizenship by descent, particularly for those born abroad who already hold another citizenship and belong to generations far removed from their Italian ancestor.
Prior to the reform, many iure sanguinis citizenship cases—based on the transmission of citizenship by bloodline from parent to child—were primarily a matter of documentation: reconstructing the genealogical lineage, proving that the ancestor had not lost citizenship before the birth of the next descendant, and gathering records, translations, and apostilles. A complex but linear task: if the chain held, it was sufficient to prove that citizenship had been transmitted without interruption.
Following the reform, the documentary chain may no longer suffice in cases affected by the new limitations. The judge does not only look at whether the family tree is correct, but also when and how the applicant took action. The question shifts: before March 27, 2025, had the applicant already initiated the process for recognition, or did they only have a generic intention to do so?
In the cases decided in Bologna, the court deemed that the plaintiffs had produced sufficient evidence of taking action prior to the reform. Elements considered included: communications with consular offices before March 27, 2025, emails sent via certified email (PEC), attempts to access the consular system, a professional mandate signed in April 2024, and other documents clearly demonstrating the intent to seek recognition.
This is the core of the decisions. The court did not rule that merely thinking about wanting to become Italian is enough, nor is it sufficient to have an Italian ancestor and appear in court after the reform. Instead, it placed value on a documentary trail dating prior to March 27, 2025: records, communications, mandates, and attempts that showed a “clear and unequivocal intent” to request citizenship before the law changed.
Put simply, the difference is between saying “sooner or later I wanted to apply” and being able to prove “I had already started applying, using the methods available at the time.” In the former case, there is a private intention, which is difficult to prove. In the latter, there is documented behavior: the applicant gathered records, retained a lawyer, wrote to the consulate, and left a dated proof of it all.
However, these rulings do not establish a rule valid for everyone. They are first-instance decisions: they can be appealed and do not bind other courts. Another judge, even when faced with a similar case, could arrive at a different conclusion. This is one of the most delicate aspects of the current phase: post-Tajani case law is still under construction, and minor differences in facts or documents can carry significant weight.
One of the most complicated aspects concerns the Prenot@mi system, the platform used to book appointments at many consulates. The new regulation gives weight to applications submitted and appointments scheduled by the offices. Yet, many applicants were unable to secure an appointment because calendars were fully booked or virtually inaccessible for long periods. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask: can the State penalize those who did not obtain an appointment, if the public system itself made it nearly impossible?
Bologna does not resolve the matter in a general sense: it does not state that every failed attempt is equivalent to a formal application. However, it does say that, in certain cases, the judge can look at the totality of the facts and evaluate whether, even without an appointment, the applicant had already taken demonstrable steps prior to the reform.
This is why litigation strategy becomes decisive. It is no longer enough to simply file a folder of civil status records and wait for the judge to apply the traditional framework of iure sanguinis. The case must be meticulously built: organizing the facts, explaining the applicant’s conduct prior to March 27, 2025, linking the documents to the new regulation, and, when necessary, raising constitutional or European law issues. In a matter that has become so technical, the manner in which the case is presented can matter almost as much as the documents themselves.
The decision must also be read in light of ruling no. 63/2026 of the Constitutional Court, filed on April 30, 2026. According to the interpretation proposed by Aprigliano International Law Firm—an interpretation by the firm, not an undisputed fact—that ruling scaled back the concept of citizenship by descent as a status acquired at birth, permanent, and always actionable. Instead, it brought it closer to a position that can be restricted if the applicant failed to clear a certain procedural threshold prior to the reform. After 2025, the debate is no longer just about genealogy, but also about the effects of the change in law on those who had already started the process.
Furthermore, a European level remains open, which also concerns those who did not take action by March 27, 2025. Italian citizenship is not merely a national status: it grants access to European Union citizenship, and for this reason, the new restrictions could raise questions of EU law. A judge who deems these doubts well-founded can follow two paths: directly disapply the Tajani Decree, recognizing citizenship based on the regulations in force before March 27, 2025, or refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. In matters of citizenship, EU law prevails: where the Italian regulation conflicts with it, the Italian one must yield.
The most prudent takeaway is this: for those who had already acted before March 27, 2025, solid and verifiable proof can make all the difference. For those who had not yet moved, however, the decisions do not close all doors, but they indicate that different arguments will be required—and that the European route is currently the most promising ground. In both scenarios, it is no longer enough to ask whether an Italian ancestor exists: one must understand which legal path is still viable, with what evidence, before which judge, and at what risk. These rulings are favorable to the plaintiffs, but they are not a shortcut for everyone, nor a consolidated shift in case law: they are a sign that, after the Tajani Decree, it is the strategy with which a case is framed that makes the difference today.
